FIRST DIVISION
IGNACIO E. MAYLAS, JR., A.M.
No. RTJ-06-2012
Complainant, [OCA-IPI No. 04-2106-RTJ]
Present:
-
versus - Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
JUDGE MANUEL L. SESE,
Regional Trial Court of Promulgated:
Respondent. August 4, 2006
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RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In
this administrative complaint, respondent Judge Manuel L. Sese of the Regional
Trial Court of Masbate City, Branch 45, was charged by complainant Ignacio E.
Maylas, Jr. with gross ignorance of the law, incompetence, violation and willful
disregard of the Rules of Court in connection with Criminal Case No. 10911
entitled People v. PSI Jeremias A. Sanchez and SPOI Emilio G. Quime.
Complainant
alleged that the accused in Criminal Case No. 10911 filed a Motion to Quash on
the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense. However, on
The
motion for reconsideration filed by the public prosecutor was denied by the
respondent judge; hence, a petition for certiorari was filed before the Court
of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 82283. On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
present petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writ prayed for accordingly
GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated
October 14, 2003 and December 3, 2003 dismissing Criminal Case No. 10911 and
denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the public prosecutor,
respectively, are hereby both ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 10911 is hereby REINSTATED
and the
SO ORDERED.
In
his Comment, respondent judge alleged that the assailed Order was issued after careful
evaluation of the information and relevant pieces of evidence; that he was
merely exercising his adjudicative functions so he cannot be administratively
charged; that the complaint did not impute malice or bad faith on his part;
that the filing of the complaint is premature because judicial remedies are
available.
In
the Report dated
We
agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
Plainly,
the error attributed to respondent judge pertains to the exercise of his
adjudicative functions. As a matter of
policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty and corruption, the acts of
a judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability – civil,
criminal or administrative – for any of his official acts, no matter how
erroneous as long as he acts in good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud,
dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do an injustice
will be administratively sanctioned.
Settled is the rule that errors committed by a judge in the exercise of
his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative
proceedings, but should instead be assailed through judicial remedies.[2]
Section
2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court mandates that, in a motion to quash, the
court shall not consider any ground other than those stated in the motion, except
lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged.
In Criminal Case No. 10911, respondent judge erred when he considered a
ground not raised by the accused. As
found by the Court of Appeals, the error in issuing the assailed Order dated
October 14, 2003 is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. However, grave abuse of discretion alone is
not a ground for disciplinary proceedings.
The filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for
the correction of actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of
propriety, where a sufficient judicial remedy exists,[3]
thus:
[T]he law provides
ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a
Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors
or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in
appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of
procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for
reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for
new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary
remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary
in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or
neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for
change of venue, as the case may be.
Now,
the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and
criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a
substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or
extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion
of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding
action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures
against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative,
or criminal nature. It is only after the
available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals
have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil
or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.[4]
Even
granting that respondent judge erred in the issuance of the assailed Order, he
could not be held administratively liable considering that there is no proof
that such error of judgment was tainted with bias or partiality, fraud,
dishonesty, bad faith, deliberate intent to do an injustice, or gross
ignorance. To merit disciplinary action,
the error or mistake must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in bad
faith. In the absence of a showing to
the contrary, defective or erroneous decision or order is presumed to have been
issued in good faith.[5] As noted by the OCA, the complaint did not
impute malice or bad faith on the part of respondent judge hence, he is
presumed to have acted in good faith.
Moreover, in his Comment, respondent claimed that he issued the assailed
Order after a careful examination of the records of the case.
WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing, the instant administrative case against Judge Manuel L. Sese of
the
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
Chairperson
MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate
Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo
F. Sundiam and Japar B. Dimaampao.
[2] Planas v. Reyes, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1905,
[3] Barbers v. Laguio,
Jr., A.M. No.
RTJ-00-1568,
[4]
[5] Planas v. Reyes, supra at 159.